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Remembering the past is a core feature of human beings, enabling them to maintain a
sense of wholeness and identity and preparing them for the demands of the future. Forget-
ting operates in a dynamic neural connection with remembering, allowing the elimination
of unnecessary or irrelevant information overload and decreasing interference. Stress and
traumatic experiences could affect this connection, resulting in memory disturbances, such
as functional amnesia. An overview of clinical, epidemiological, neuropsychological, and
neurobiological aspects of functional amnesia is presented, by preponderantly resorting
to own data from patients with functional amnesia. Patients were investigated medically,
neuropsychologically, and neuroradiologically. A detailed report of a new case is included
to illustrate the challenges posed by making an accurate differential diagnosis of functional
amnesia, a condition that may encroach on the boundaries between psychiatry and neu-
rology. Several mechanisms may play a role in “forgetting” in functional amnesia, such as
retrieval impairments, consolidating defects, motivated forgetting, deficits in binding and
reassembling details of the past, deficits in establishing a first person autonoetic connec-
tion with personal events, and loss of information. In a substantial number of patients,
we observed a synchronization abnormality between a frontal lobe system, important for
autonoetic consciousness, and a temporo-amygdalar system, important for evaluation and
emotions, which provides empirical support for an underlying mechanism of dissociation (a
failure of integration between cognition and emotion).This observation suggests a mnestic
blockade in functional amnesia that is triggered by psychological or environmental stress
and is underpinned by a stress hormone mediated synchronization abnormality during
retrieval between processing of affect-laden events and fact-processing.
Keywords: dissociative amnesia, psychogenic amnesia, head injury, psychosocial stress, mnestic block syndrome
INTRODUCTION
Weinrich (1997), the author of “Lethe–Kunst und Kritik des
Vergessens” (Lethe – Art and Critique of Forgetting) argued that
human beings are by nature forgetting creatures (animal oblivis-
cens) and that we frequently use the word “forgetting” to be
reminded, not to forget someone or something (“Forget-me-not”
has been the flower of the loving couples since the fifteenth cen-
tury). As Edward Casey commented, Heidegger in “Time and
Being” interpreted forgetfulness as being “more primordial than
remembering” (Casey, 2000, p. 8) and Nietzsche emphasized the
virtue of “active forgetfulness.”
Suggestions about the benefits of an optimum balance between
forgetting and remembering can be traced back before Ribot’s
time (Hacking, 1995), to the Greek mythology, where goddess
Lethe, symbolizing forgetting complemented Mnemosyne, repre-
senting memory. Incidentally, exceptional mnemonical abilities
were not typically identified as a blessing by their owners (Luria,
1987; Parker et al., 2006). On the contrary, similarly to the prospect
that “every second of our lives recurs an infinite number of times”
(Kundera, 1985, p. 5), the prospect of “running” (remembering)
our entire life on a daily basis appeared as being terrifying and
burdening (Parker et al., 2006). James (1984, p. 262) stated that:
“If we remembered everything, we should on most occasions be
as ill off as if we remembered nothing.” The disease brought by
remembering everything was later on metaphorically illustrated by
Borges’ character, the memorious Funes, who reaches a state where
he cannot act anymore (Eco et al., 1999). On the other hand, for-
getting the past is perceived as a significant threat to the identity of
individuals or groups, especially in highly individualized societies.
The “loss” of memory – amnesia – has been regarded as a major
handicap for an individual, being often equated in the past with
dementia. Media often portray societies plagued by an excessive
fear of forgetting (Hacking, 1995) or being forgotten, a fear that is
named athazagoraphobia.
Here we focus on discussing research data aiming to unravel
the “mystery” of forgetting in so-called functional amnesia. After
defining functional amnesia, we briefly outline the memory sys-
tems and their main neural correlates. We then review clinical,
epidemiological, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging findings
of functional amnesia and discuss the pathophysiological mech-
anisms of “forgetting” in functional memory “loss,” by prepon-
derantly resorting to own patient research data. We emphasize
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that both prototypical and cases that radiate from the prototype
(“radial classes,” Hacking, 1995) are essential for the understand-
ing of this condition and discuss the diagnostic challenges posed
by the radial cases.
WHAT IS FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA?
The meaning of the term functional amnesia has undergone
changes over time. Initially seen as the antipode of so-called
“organic” amnesia, the use of the term functional amnesia shifted
to designate amnesic disorders that occur without evidence of sig-
nificant brain damage as detected by conventional structural brain
imaging techniques and have an unsure etiology. When brain dam-
age is present, the extent and/or nature of amnesia do not match
the locus and/or severity of the brain lesion (Piolino et al., 2005).
Although several authors still use the terms psychogenic, disso-
ciative or functional amnesia interchangeably, implicitly acknowl-
edging that a number of functional amnesias have a psychological
basis (Kritchevsky et al., 2004), some differences among the the-
oretical scaffolding of these terminologies exist. The term disso-
ciative amnesia defines a form of psychogenic amnesia underlain
by the psychological mechanism of dissociation (Janet, 1907, p.
23). It belongs to the dissociative disorders in DSM-IV-TR (2000),
which are characterized by subjectively perceived disturbances of
the integrated organization of memory, perception, consciousness,
identity, or emotion, and are regarded as being causally bound to
psychological trauma or stress (Spiegel et al., 2011). In contrast
to the term dissociative amnesia, which is theoretically charged
a priori, the term psychogenic amnesia refers to amnesic disorders
that are etiologically linked to a larger variety of psychological
mechanisms (McKay and Kopelman, 2009). The concept of func-
tional amnesia (Schultz, 1924; Lundholm, 1932) was suggested by
De Renzu et al. (1997, p. 788) as a “more suitable term to classify
patients whose memory disorders cannot be traced back to organic
or psychological causes.” Several cases of functional amnesia were
found to occur on a background of psychological stress or trauma,
alone or in combination with a co-occurring physical insult. This
co-occurring physical insult is usually of mild severity (such as a
mild traumatic brain injury or electrocuting accident; e.g., Tra-
moni et al., 2009), but more severe physical insults were described
as well (Fast and Fujiwara, 2001; Pommerenke et al., 2012). In
some case reports of functional amnesia, a clear-cut psychological
etiological mechanism could not be identified (De Renzu et al.,
1997; Fujiwara et al., 2008). The lack of identifiable psychologi-
cal factors in some cases of functional amnesia may be accounted
for by the retrograde amnesia itself, by impaired emotional pro-
cessing, or the so-called incubation effect of life adversity (Post
et al., 1995; Lupien et al., 2009). As Kopelman (2000) pointed out,
the identification of precipitating psychological factors in cases of
amnesia is not always straightforward (Markowitsch et al., 1993).
It may require a perseverant archeological work to get to the well
of the illness.
A minority of cases of so-labeled functional amnesias may
represent early stages of particular neurodegenerative forms of
amnesia with early age of onset, where the morphological changes
initially might escape capturing by conventional structural brain
investigations, but may declare themselves afterward (Ladowsky-
Brooks and Fischer, 2003). There are reports in the literature of
conditions that had initially been deemed as functional or hys-
terical, but subsequently re-classified as due to a general medical
condition (Slater and Glithero,1965). Stone (2009,p. 186) however
remarked that “‘misdiagnosis’ for ‘conversion symptoms’ in stud-
ies since 1970s has on average been around only 4% at 5 years.” He
stated further: “This is the same as for other neurological and psy-
chiatric conditions such as multiple sclerosis and schizophrenia”
(p. 186). Albeit occurrences of misdiagnosis may be less frequent
nowadays (Stone, 2009), they nevertheless bring us to the crit-
ical points that had been raised with respect to using the term
functional amnesia (Kanaan et al., 2012). McKay and Kopelman
(2009, p. 152) argued that the “term ‘functional’ amnesia has the
problem that the amnesia could in many respects be considered
dysfunctional.” Furthermore, the assertion that the term func-
tional “in its proper sense means that the lesion affects function
and not substrate” (De Renzu et al., 1997, p. 788) is nowadays
challenged by findings of studies that combined functional and
newer structural neuroimaging methods (Tramoni et al., 2009).
Since the advent of functional imaging, research data have increas-
ingly been providing evidence in functional amnesia of functional
and metabolic changes in brain areas that are agreed upon to
exert a crucial role in memory processes (Markowitsch, 1999a;
Brand et al., 2009; Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2010b; Thomas-
Antérion et al., 2010). Additionally, the recent broader use of
imaging techniques such as diffusion tensor imaging or magne-
tization transfer ratio measurements started to provide evidence
in this condition of subtle micro-structural changes of fiber tracts
involved in conscious mnemonic processing (e.g., Tramoni et al.,
2009), questioning therefore the above understanding of the con-
struct “functional” put forth by De Renzu et al. (1997). Another
challenge to this concept comes from more recent data showing
that, in contrast to old views of functional amnesia as a reversible
condition, in a substantial number of patients with functional
amnesia the (episodic-autobiographical) memory impairments
followed a chronic, unremitting course (Kritchevsky et al., 2004;
Fujiwara et al., 2008). In some cases there may even be cognitive
deterioration over time (Kessler et al., 1997).
Despite its imperfections, the construct functional amnesia
seems better suited for capturing this condition than other ter-
minologies (Stone, 2009). It furthermore provides a common
“intellectual” framework for studying psychiatric and neurolog-
ical diseases (Markowitsch, 1999b; Stone, 2009; Kanaan et al.,
2012). As Markowitsch (1999a, p. 335) stated “A common frame-
work for psychiatry and neurosciences emphasized 115 [years]
ago by Meynert who attempted to explain all psychic functions by
anatomy and physiology [. . .], is nevertheless a central aim for . . .
the next century [. . .].”
MEMORY SYSTEMS
Understanding various types of functional amnesia might be aided
by a brief overview of the current main classifications of the mem-
ory systems and processes. Memory is not a unity, but is divided
along the time and content dimensions. Along the time axis, short-
term memory has been limited to a few bits (4–7) and a time
range of seconds to minutes (Miller, 1956; Cowan, 2000). Badde-
ley extended the concept of short-term memory by adding that of
“working memory” (Baddeley and Hitch, 1974; Baddeley, 2000).
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Working memory involves the online-holding not only of new
information, but also the retrieval of components of old, already
stored information (Aben et al., 2012).
Another important time-bound categorization involves the dis-
tinction between old and new memories, and anterograde and
retrograde amnesia, respectively. The term anterograde amnesia
was reportedly advanced by Charcot to account for the “patho-
logical forgetting” of events that happened after the traumatic
event (Janet et al., 2001). Following Etienne Eugéne Azam (1822–
1899), Charcot reportedly used the construct“retrograde amnesia”
(Janet et al., 2001). With respect to the classification of long-
term memory according to content, already on the beginning
twentieth century, several authors suggested the existence of var-
ious forms of memory (Semon, 1904; Ziehen, 1908; Schneider,
1912, 1928). The work of Tulving (1972) – in human research
domain, and that of Mishkin and Petri (1984) – in animal research,
promoted divisions between the episodic and semantic memory
(Tulving, 1972, 1983) or the memory and habit system (Mishkin
and Petri, 1984). These divisions were followed by more refined
categorizations, encompassing procedural, and priming memory
system (Squire et al., 1993; Tulving, 1995). Five long-term mem-
ory systems were ultimately proposed to exist by Tulving and
Markowitsch [“procedural memory,”“priming,”“perceptual mem-
ory,”“semantic memory,”“episodic(-autobiographical) memory”;
cf. e.g., Markowitsch, 2003; Tulving, 2005], which are considered
to build up ontogenetically and phylogenetically onto each other
(see also Nelson and Fivush, 2004).
These systems have distinct or partly distinct neural substrates
and different degrees of susceptibility to environmental insults
(Figure 1). They are assumed to be accompanied by different
levels of consciousness. The first two memory systems (prim-
ing and procedural memory) are devoid of the need for con-
sciousness (“anoetic”). [The terms autonoetic (“self-conscious,”
or “self-aware”), noetic (“aware”), and anoetic (“not-aware”) were
introduced and elaborated on by Tulving, 1995]. Perceptual mem-
ory system, which is the newest addition to the long-term memory
systems, acts consciously (“noetically”), but on a presemantic level,
and relies on familiarity judgments. It enables the identification
of an apple, no matter what color it has or whether it is already
half eaten or not; it also allows distinguishing an apple from a pear
on the presemantic level. The mnemonic performance in the per-
ceptual memory system remains however insufficiently explored
experimentally, perhaps due to a lack of consensus among the
researchers about what perceptual memory means (Eustache and
Desgranges, 2008).
Semantic memory comprises general semantic knowledge
(school and world knowledge) and autobiographical-semantic
knowledge (knowledge of name, date of birth, or self-traits).
The episodic memory is presently defined as the conjunction of
subjective time, autonoetic consciousness, and the experiencing
self (Tulving, 2005) and the episodic memory system is con-
sidered to be equivalent to the episodic-autobiographical mem-
ory system (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a,b). While seman-
tic memory is accompanied by noetic consciousness, episodic-
autographical memory features a superior level of consciousness
(autonoetic consciousness). Autonoetic consciousness entails a
“sense of self in time and the ability to relive subjective experiences
from the encoding context by mentally traveling back in time”
(Lemogne et al., 2006, p. 260). Mental time traveling through
subjective time from present to both past and future is accord-
ing to Piolino et al. (2009) one of the last features of episodic-
autographical memory that becomes fully functional, but the first
one to be afflicted by aging and amnesic conditions (see also
Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). For the present article, espe-
cially the episodic-autobiographical memory system is of impor-
tance, as this is consistently and often severely affected in patients
with functional amnesia.
Episodic-autographical memory is considered to develop the
latest phylogenetically, being arguably uniquely human (Clayton
and Dickinson, 1998; Tulving, 2005). Ontogenetically, episodic-
autographical memory represents the last acquisition (Nelson
and Fivush, 2004; Tulving, 2005; Piolino et al., 2007), emerg-
ing in concert with other cognitive abilities (Nelson and Fivush,
2004; Wang, 2008; Picard et al., 2009). The earliest childhood
episodic-autographical memory typically dates to around age
3.5 years, but individual, cultural, and gender differences exist
(Wang, 2001; Harpaz-Rotem and Hirst, 2005; Davis et al., 2008).
Developmental changes of episodic-autographical memory and to
some degree of autobiographical-semantic memory may however
extend beyond childhood into early adolescent years (Picard et al.,
2009; Willoughby et al., 2012).
THE NEUROANATOMICAL BASES OF MEMORY
The present theoretical approach to memory processing empha-
sizes that both specialization and integration are features of the
human brain (Paus, 2010). It is assumed that information enters
the brain via the sensory organs and is then further processed
according to the kind of information and the process selected or
triggered. This implies that subconsciously processed informa-
tion is directly led to unimodal neocortical structures (priming),
or engages the basal ganglia, premotor, and other motor-related
areas (procedural learning). Consciously processed information
engages more widespread networks which are still largely neocor-
tical for perceptual learning, but include limbic regions for the
semantic memory and episodic-autographical memory systems.
For the latter two memory systems incoming information first
enters limbic structures where its biological and social relevance
is extracted, the information is compared with already exist-
ing related information and later bound to and integrated with
these (synchronization; Axmacher et al., 2006). Further consoli-
dation occurs during sleep (Stickgold and Walker, 2005). Inciden-
tally, a pronounced number of patients with functional amnesia
report sleep disturbances (Loewenstein, 1991). Modest correla-
tions between sleep disturbances and dissociative experiences were
found, though their meaning is incompletely understood (Lynn
et al., 2012). A labile sleep-wake cycle might lead to dream-like
experiences, via intrusions of sleep-related material into the wake-
fulness, which might in turn promote dissociative experiences.
Furthermore, a labile sleep-wake cycle might impact on cognitive
processing, such as mnemonic processing and attentional control
(Lynn et al., 2012).
The process of memory consolidation may extend to years
(Haist et al., 2001); this might hamper the accurate identifica-
tion of the mechanisms (retrieval versus consolidating deficit)
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FIGURE 1 |The five long-term memory systems.
underlying certain amnesic conditions (Miller and Sweatt, 2006).
Widespread nets within the cerebral cortex are seen as pivotal for
storage of memories (Markowitsch, 1985; Mesulam, 1998; for a
description of the nets, see the next paragraph). Storage is however
never final, as new information or the retrieval of already existing
one leads to re-consolidation and new storage in the context of the
last re-consolidation (Wood, 2003; Fulton, 2006; Nader and Hardt,
2009; Nadel et al., 2012). This constitutes the basis for pharmaco-
logical studies that aim to weaken traumatic, disturbing memories
by interfering with their assumed post-retrieval re-consolidation
(Brunet et al., 2008).
Retrieving facts and events requires the engagement of three
intimately interacting networks, namely activating brain stem
structures comprising portions of the reticular activating system,
the main information of the respective fact or event containing
neocortical network plus – especially for the events or episodes – a
limbic network providing the emotional flavor (Anderson et al.,
2006). According to Tulving’s SPI model (serial, parallel, inde-
pendent= SPI), information is encoded serially, may be stored in
parallel in different memory systems and can be retrieved indepen-
dently of the system in which encoding occurred. The SPI model
is of importance for patients with functional amnesia. As Spiegel
et al. (2011) remarked, the preserved ability to retrieve information
from other memory systems than the episodic-autobiographical
one might have led researchers or clinicians to wrongly conclude
that the person’s amnesia was feigned.
Data from single and group studies of neurological patients
emphasize the importance of regions of the limbic system for
encoding episodic-autographical and, to a lesser extent, seman-
tic memories (see Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). The most
investigated region of the limbic system is the hippocampal for-
mation, due to the seminal writings on patient Henry G. Molaison
by Brenda Milner (see Corkin, 2002; Squire, 2009). After under-
going neurosurgery for pharmacologically intractable seizures,
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the premorbidly cognitively intact young man Henry Molaison
became severely anterogradely and in part retrogradely amnesic;
longitudinal follow-up indicated that his cognitive performance
might have further deteriorated over time compared to individ-
uals of his age. His main impairment after brain surgery was his
inability to consciously acquire factual and episodic information
and events for long-term storage (cf. Figure 1 of Squire, 2009);
in addition he showed – when tested several years later – deficits
in the conscious retrieval of events. Several researchers concluded
that the region within the medial temporal lobe responsible for
the severe memory impairment in the episodic-autobiographical
domain was the hippocampus proper (e.g., Vargha-Khadem et al.,
1997),while surrounding structures – damaged in Henry Molaison
as well – might be necessary for semantic memory processing.
Other regions within the limbic system are important bot-
tleneck structures for episodic-autographical memory encoding
(Brand and Markowitsch, 2003; Markowitsch, 2008; Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012a), such as medial and anterior diencephalon,
the amygdala, and the basal forebrain (septal nuclei, basal nucleus
of Meynert, diagonal band of Broca; Figure 2). Bilateral damage
to the medial (and to a certain degree to the anterior) diencephalic
structures leads to severe anterograde amnesia. As this region
contains a number of fibers (mammillothalamic tract, internal
medullary lamina), some amnesic conditions may be viewed as a
“disconnection syndrome” due to the disruption of connections
between distant brain structures (Markowitsch, 1988).
Within the hypothalamus, the mammillary bodies were
implicated in conscious memory processing a long time ago
(Markowitsch, 1992). This was largely due to their degenera-
tion in patients with Korsakoff ’s syndrome (Markowitsch, 2010;
Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). The Korsakoff ’s syndrome is
the prototypical example of diencephalic amnesia and is character-
ized by both anterograde and retrograde impairments of mainly
episodic-autographical memory, but sometimes semantic mem-
ory as well, as well as confabulations and disorientation with
respect to time and place. The syndrome is typically described in
patients with chronic alcohol abuse and vitamin B1 (thiamine)
deficiency or various medical conditions with severe thiamine
deficiency (cf. Markowitsch, 2010).
As the two amygdaloid nuclei are located widely apart, they
are rarely damaged exclusively and bilaterally. An exception is the
Urbach–Wiethe disease, a genetic condition that can lead to a
selective calcification of both amygdala (Markowitsch et al., 1994).
As a consequence of bilateral damage of amygdala-structures,
patients with Urbach–Wiethe disease may suffer problems with the
processing of emotionally laden episodic-autobiographical infor-
mation (Cahill et al., 1995; Siebert et al., 2003). The amygdala
contributes to encoding, consolidating, and retrieval of emotional
FIGURE 2 | Sagittal view of the human brain showing structures centrally implicated in information processing, especially with respect to the transfer
of newly acquired memories for long-term storage.
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personal events. A working tandem may exist between the amyg-
dala and septal nuclei (von Cramon and Markowitsch, 2000).
Activity of a normal septum dampens emotional processing, while
activity of a non-damaged amygdala enhances it.
As outlined above, the limbic system structures are engaged in a
complementary, but closely interwoven way in acquiring episodic-
autographical information, while neocortical and in part limbic
areas represent the major storage places. The combined activation
of right hemispheric fronto-temporal regions serves as trigger sta-
tions for retrieving stored episodic-autographical events (Brand
and Markowitsch, 2006; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). The
corresponding regional complex in the left hemisphere seems to
trigger the retrieval of old semantic information (Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012a). Frontal regions as well as parietal areas have
been attributed roles in mental time traveling and subjective time
coding (Nyberg et al., 2010).
The fiber system, interconnecting the fronto-temporal regions
is the uncinate fascicle. The right uncinate fascicle contains 33%
more fibers and is 27% larger than the left one (Highley et al.,
2002). It was ascribed functions in episodic-autobiographical
memory and emotional processing (Markowitsch, 1995b).
Retrograde amnesia for personal events might arise from a
synchronization abnormality during retrieval between processing
of affectively laden personal events (that is assumed to prefer-
entially and preponderantly engage the right hemisphere) and
fact-based processing (that is considered to preferentially and
preponderantly engage the left hemisphere; Fink et al., 1996;
Markowitsch et al., 2000b). It might be due to a neurological
event that leads to damage of right fronto-temporal connections
(such as the right uncinate fascicle; Levine et al., 1998, 2009; LaBar
and Cabeza, 2006; Fouquet et al., 2009) or a psychological stress-
induced right fronto-temporal disconnectivity (Reinhold et al.,
2006; Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2007, 2009; Brand et al., 2009).
Right fronto-temporal disconnections have also been described
in cases of functional amnesia triggered by a mixture of psycho-
logical and physical factors (Piolino et al., 2005; Tramoni et al.,
2009).
FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA AND ITS TYPES
The memory impairment in functional amnesia is usually of a
retrograde nature, but might at times be anterograde as well.
Although impaired recall of autobiographical events is the most
prominent symptom in psychogenic amnesia, deficits in retrieving
personal facts, and general semantic (non-personal) knowledge
can also occur (Barbarotto et al., 1996; Kritchevsky et al., 2004;
Fujiwara et al., 2008). In addition, variable degrees of anterograde
memory deficits (as detected by standard anterograde memory
tests; Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a) can accompany the retro-
grade amnesia. However, in most patients with functional amnesia,
anterograde mnemonic processing was reported to be preserved
to a large extent (De Renzu et al., 1997; Glisky et al., 2004; Brand
et al., 2009).
Often, anterograde amnesia occurs initially and it then resolves
or becomes mild. The delay between the onset of functional
amnesia and the time of neuropsychological study may lead
to an underestimation of the anterograde memory deficit that
could have been part of the initial picture of the functional
amnesic condition (Coons and Milstein, 1992; Kopelman, 2000).
In comparison to functional retrograde amnesia, cases of func-
tional anterograde amnesia with preserved retrograde episodic-
autobiographical memory (Kumar et al., 2007; Smith et al., 2010;
Staniloiu et al., 2010a), or cases of functional amnesia with antero-
grade memory impairments out of proportion in comparison to
the retrograde memory impairments, have less frequently been
reported or acknowledged (reviewed in Markowitsch, 1992). In
contrast to the DSM-IV-TR (2000) description that popularizes
the view of dissociative amnesia as being prototypically retrograde,
Janet described several patients with anterograde amnesia that
involved a mechanism of dissociation (“psychological disintegra-
tion”). He observed that in these cases “instead of losing engrams
that they have acquired, patients do not acquire any engram”(Janet
et al., 2001, p. 485). One of these patients was Mrs. D, a 34-year-
old woman who was studied both by Souques (1892) and Janet
(1892) at the invitation of Charcot. After suffering an emotional
traumatic event, Mrs. D developed retrograde amnesia spanning a
period of almost 4 months prior to the incident as well as profound
anterograde amnesia. According to Janet, her speech and reason-
ing were intact, she recalled everything she had learned before,
but was forgetting all new information presented to her after 2
or 3 min (Janet et al., 2001). Several historical cases that had been
labeled as Korsakoff ’s syndrome would nowadays better fit criteria
for a diagnosis of functional amnesia (Markowitsch, 1992).
Functional amnesia may affect memories from across the whole
life-span or just those from a specific time period or with a spe-
cific content. For instance, some patients “forget” events which
happened within a clear time window, for example within the
last 6 years, or within the last 13 years before the critical incident.
With respect to content, the amnesia may affect all autobio-
graphical memories, or be restricted to specific autobiographical
material.
Retrograde psychogenic amnesia might be accompanied by
suddenly leaving the customary environment and compromised
knowledge about personal identity. This variant was named dis-
sociative or psychogenic fugue (Markowitsch et al., 1997). Dis-
sociative amnesia or fugue may co-occur with other dissociative
or somatoform disorders, such as conversion disorder or Ganser
syndrome. The Ganser syndrome is currently considered a Disso-
ciative Disorder Not Otherwise Specified in DSM-IV-TR (2000),
where it is solely defined by giving approximate answers to ques-
tions (vorbeireden). Ganser’s (1898, 1904) original description
of the syndrome however encompassed a hysterical semitrance,
a tendency to give approximate answers, amnesia, and hallu-
cinations. The Ganser syndrome had initially been described
in young men with a forensic background. Later on the syn-
drome was reported in non-forensic contexts and women and
children as well (Nardi and Di Scipio, 1977), with a substantial
number of cases being found in migrants or ethnic minorities
(for a review, see Staniloiu et al., 2009). In Ganser syndrome
comorbidities are common and epidemiological data are insuf-
ficient (Dalfen and Feinstein, 2000). As Dwyer and Reid (2004,
p. 473) stated, all in all “Ganser’s syndrome remains an enigma,
but despite its rarity it should not be forgotten, for it serves to
highlight the limitations of our understanding of the disordered
mind.”
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THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA
Little is known about the epidemiology of functional amnesia
per se. This is partly due to the fact that “functional amnesia” cur-
rently designates no diagnostic entity in international classifica-
tions of diseases (ICD-10, 1992; DSM-IV-TR, 2000). Although its
prevalence or incidence cannot be ascertained, there are hints that
its frequency is underestimated in the research field (Brandt and
van Gorp, 2006). Brandt and van Gorp (2006, p. 332) asserted that
“all the dissociative disorders are extremely rare.” Some authors
concluded that certain dissociative disorders simply do not exist
in their countries (Takahashi, 1991; Fujii et al., 1998) and others
viewed their existence as being the product of cultural contamina-
tion (Xiao et al., 2006; Pope et al., 2007). Coons and Milstein (1992)
stated that the incidence of psychogenic amnesia among their adult
service patients was 1.8%. Furthermore, they commented that the
condition may be overlooked when subtler presentations exist or
when other primary psychiatric conditions are superimposed. In
a recent review article, Spiegel et al. (2011) noted that the reported
prevalence values for dissociative amnesia range between 1.8 and
7.3%. Johnson et al. (2006) reported for dissociative amnesia a
12-month-prevalence of 1.8% in a USA community of 658 adults
who were assessed with psychiatric interview.
The sex ratio in dissociative amnesia was reported to be roughly
balanced (Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008). Some studies however
described a higher frequency of psychogenic amnesia in women
(Coons and Milstein, 1992), while others in men (Kanzer, 1939;
Fujiwara, 2004; Kritchevsky et al., 2004).
Most of the cases of psychogenic amnesia are diagnosed in
the third or fourth decade (Schacter et al., 1982; Coons and Mil-
stein, 1992; Fujiwara, 2004). In the sample of Coons and Milstein
the age ranged from 17 to 51 years. The mean educational level
was 12.7 years; the years of education, however ranged from 9 to
18 years (Coons and Milstein, 1992). These findings are consistent
with results from other studies (Fujiwara, 2004; Kritchevsky et al.,
2004; Brand et al., 2009). With respect to marital and employ-
ment status, the findings vary among studies (Coons and Milstein,
1992; Fujiwara, 2004). Coons and Milstein (1992) found that 40%
of their sample had recurrent episodes of psychogenic amnesia.
Abeles and Schilder (1935) reported a recurrent rate of 24%. Coons
and Milstein (1992) attributed the elevated rate of recurrence in
their sample to the nature of their assessment setting (a tertiary
care unit).
THE NEUROPSYCHOLOGY OF FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA
The neuropsychological examination of patients with func-
tional amnesia reveals several characteristics. Patients with func-
tional amnesia often present with impairments of episodic-
autobiographical memory, which are of retrograde nature. In
comparison to the symptom of amnesia that may occur in post-
traumatic stress disorder, the memory impairment in functional
amnesia is usually more extensive, encompassing larger peri-
ods (Spiegel et al., 2011). With respect to semantic knowledge,
autobiographical-semantic knowledge may initially be impaired,
but then it is relatively quickly re-learned. Old general world
knowledge is typically preserved, but in some cases may be
affected in variable degrees (Kopelman, 2000; Brand et al., 2009).
Perceptual memory has not been formally studied in patients with
dissociative or functional amnesia. However, there are reports of
variable impairments of familiarity judgments in patients with
functional amnesia (Kanzer, 1939; Pommerenke et al., 2012); one
could therefore speculate that at least in a subset of patients the
mnemonic processing in this system may transiently or partly be
affected as well. A limited number of studies of patients with func-
tional amnesia provided objective evidence for impairments of
previously learned procedural skills or for deficits in acquiring
new procedural skills. Given that many patients quickly relearn
their skills, their initial complaints may reflect an impairment
in the “procedural discourse” (Duff et al., 2008), due to impair-
ments in the semantic memory domain (De Renzu et al., 1997).
In other cases the “loss” of skills may just represent difficulties
with initiating or carrying out a task, either due to emotional-
motivational factors or executive dysfunctions (Janet, 1907; Fuji-
wara, 2004; Smith et al., 2010). The capacity for imagining future
personal events is often affected in patients with functional amne-
sia (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011a). A deficient performance
on various prospective memory tasks may be accounted for by
impairments in episodic-autobiographical mnemonic processing,
semantic mnemonic processing, and/or executive dysfunctions
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). Executive functions have
been reported to be affected in a substantial number of patients
with functional amnesia (Fujiwara et al., 2008; Brand et al., 2009).
Already Janet described in patients with hysteria an incapacity of
“beginning”or“stopping”an“act”as well as problems with making
decisions (Janet,1907). The executive dysfunctions in patients with
functional amnesia may compound the impairments in conscious
memory retrieval. They may also contribute to abnormalities in
social information processing (social cognition and regulation;
Bull et al., 2008). Various impairments of self-referential process-
ing have been reported in patients with functional amnesia. A pro-
found loss of personal identity may accompany dense retrograde
forms of functional amnesia. Anomalous self-face processing has
been described in several cases (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011a;
Pommerenke et al., 2012) and linked to a right hemisphere dys-
function (Abe et al., 2007). Impairments in self projection in the
form of an impaired ability to imagine future personal events
(Addis et al., 2009) are often reported in patients with functional
amnesia. The ability for self-reflection may be reduced due to a
“retraction”or“narrowness”of the“field of consciousness”(as sug-
gested by Janet, see Dorahy and van der Hart, 2007) or a shift from
the autonoetic consciousness to a noetic type of consciousness.
“Autonoetic consciousness is characterized by a superior ability to
reflect upon oneself and to distinguish oneself from the social and
biological environment” (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011a, p.
719). The lack of autonoetic consciousness in functional amnesia
was also emphasized by Sullivan (1972); he stated: “In the fugue,
the self is involved, but the consciousness is not of the type to
which I would refer as fully developed. Paradoxically, there may be
conscious involvement of the self without the degree of integra-
tion to which we may apply the term self-consciousness in its usual
sense” (p. 288).
Impairments in self-regulation can reflect a malfunctioning
of the right inferolateral prefrontal cortex. This malfunction can
occur not only in patients with dissociative amnesia, but was also
reported in patients with bulimia nervosa (Marsh et al., 2009).
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Incidentally, bulimia nervosa is one of the possible comorbidities
of dissociative amnesia (Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008). Obesity
and binge eating were also listed as possible comorbidities of psy-
chogenic amnesia by Coons and Milstein (1992). Interestingly,
after the onset of functional amnesia, changes in eating preferences
have been reported, which may have various explanations (Fuji-
wara, 2004; Fujiwara et al., 2008). One possible explanation is that
they reflect a change in personality dimensions (Enzi et al., 2009).
Another (unexplored) explanation is that they may be related to
changes in the sense of smell. After mild traumatic brain injuries,
changes in olfaction are common, although patients may not be
aware of them. A substantial proportion of the changes in taste
occur in fact as a result of changes in olfaction (Haxel et al., 2008).
Another possible explanation is that several structures involved
in processing within the episodic-autobiographical memory sys-
tem (such as amygdala, parts of basal forebrain, ventro-medial
prefrontal cortex) have also been reported to be engaged in
reward-related processing (e.g., Nieuwenhuys et al., 2008). There
is currently increasing data about the interaction between the
reward system and psychological stress (Admon et al., 2012). Not
only changes in eating preferences have been reported in patients
after the onset of functional amnesia, but also changes in smok-
ing and drinking habits (Kritchevsky et al., 2004; Fujiwara et al.,
2008; Thomas-Antérion et al., 2010). One patient with a variant
of dissociative amnesia (dissociative fugue) lost his allergies and
asthma after the onset of retrograde amnesia (Markowitsch et al.,
1997). This finding is interesting, in the light of data showing that
immune functions can be changed or modulated by associative
learning processes (Vits et al., 2011).
Conversion or depersonalization symptoms may accompany
certain variants of functional amnesia and augment the sense of
identity loss (Arzy et al., 2011). These conditions may reflect, apart
from a fronto-limbic disconnection (Black et al., 2004), a malfunc-
tioning in parietal areas important for body schema, mental time
traveling, and time processing (Hoff and Pötzl, 1938; Metzinger,
2008; Nyberg et al., 2010). Various impairments of time processing
have been reported to occur in patients with functional amnesia
(Markowitsch, 2005). Social information processing (social per-
ception, cognition, and regulation) may be impaired in patients
with functional amnesia (Adolphs, 2010). The capacities for the-
ory of mind, empathy, and social and moral judgments may be
affected (Fujiwara et al., 2008; Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2009;
Croft et al., 2011). With respect to social regulation, emotional dys-
regulation, and reduced self-reflection may occur (Markowitsch
et al., 1997).
Abnormalities of emotional processing in patients with func-
tional amnesia are not surprising. Although the most recent
definition of episodic memory does not make any reference
to emotion, several authors have emphasized the intimate con-
nection of episodic-autobiographical memory with emotion
(Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011b). Comorbidities with affective
disorders (major depressive disorders) or subclinical depressive
symptoms are common in patients with dissociative amnesia and
they may have as foundation a shared neurobiological mechanism
(Simeon et al., 2007; Staniloiu et al., 2009).
According to international nosological criteria, the memory
impairment in amnes(t)ic disorders should not be due to dementia
or occur exclusively during delirium. In ICD-10 it is often spec-
ified that in amnesic disorder the “immediate” recall should be
preserved. Functional amnesia might pose a challenge to the above
mentioned diagnostic criteria. Sometimes patients with functional
amnesia present with a global intellectual deterioration, suggestive
of a dementic picture (Spiegel et al., 2011). While in some cases,
this ultimately proves to be a pseudodementia picture that remits,
in other cases the cognitive decline may persist or even worsen
over time (Markowitsch, 1992). Alterations of consciousness may
at times be profound, such as in Ganser syndrome or in amnesia
accompanying dissociative possession trance (Markowitsch, 1992;
Staniloiu et al., 2009; During et al., 2011). These alterations have
been named hysterical semitrance or stupor or pseudo delirium
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
Impairments of short-term memory may also occur in patients
with functional or dissociative amnesia (Janet, 1907; Fujiwara,
2004; Fujiwara et al., 2008) and they partly may be due to the
presence of comorbidities. Apart from comorbidities with affective
disorders, the co-occurrence of eating disorders (bulimia nervosa),
somatoform disorders, conversion disorders, alcohol misuse, anx-
iety disorders, and personality disorders (narcissistic, borderline,
antisocial) have also been described. While the generalizability of
these findings awaits confirmation from well-designed epidemio-
logical studies, nevertheless the proponents for DSM-V suggested
a change in the criteria for dissociative amnesia to allow room
for the presence of comorbidity (Spiegel et al., 2011). Long last-
ing personality changes have been reported in the context of the
onset of functional amnesia (Kritchevsky et al., 2004). This shift
in personality may modify enduring patterns of inner experi-
ence and behavior that pertain to both affectivity and cognition
(DSM-IV-TR, 2000).
A lack of concern about the current situation has been described
in substantial number of patients with functional amnesia and has
been termed “la belle indifférence” by Janet (1907); its psycho-
logical and neurobiological mechanisms are not fully understood
yet (Stone et al., 2006). Furthermore, “la belle indifférence” nei-
ther was reported to occur in all cases of functional amnesia,
nor was described to happen exclusively in amnesia of functional
(psychogenic) origin (Wilson et al., 1950; Fujiwara, 2004).
THE COURSE OF FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA
Functional amnesias can be classified into acute and chronic,
respectively. Amnesias persisting over a month period have
been deemed chronic. This duration cut-off for chronicity may
stem from older studies, which showed that a high percent-
age of psychogenic amnesias resolved within a month from
their onset (Abeles and Schilder, 1935; Kanzer, 1939; Loewen-
stein, 1991). For the last two decades, several authors have
reported that in a substantial number of patients with func-
tional or psychogenic amnesia the memory impairment follows
a chronic course (Coons and Milstein, 1992; Kritchevsky et al.,
2004; Fujiwara et al., 2008; Thomas-Antérion et al., 2010). The
discrepancy between older and newer studies with respect to
the course of amnesia may be accounted for by several fac-
tors, such as the referral bias, the employment of increasingly
sophisticated neuropsychological methods for the investigation
of memory impairment and the changes, which occurred in the
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conceptualizations of episodic-autobiographical memory (Coons
and Milstein, 1992; Kritchevsky et al., 2004; Tulving, 2005; Spiegel
et al., 2011; Barnabe et al., 2012).
MECHANISMS OF FORGETTING IN FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA
The psychological stress model: stress and
episodic-autobiographical memory retrieval blockade
Albeit some authors still dispute their legitimacy, regarding them
exclusively as a culture-bound syndrome that flourished in the
1800s (Pope et al., 2007), dissociative (psychogenic) amnesic dis-
orders have been linked to psychological trauma or stress in a
variety of cultures (Thom and Fenton, 1920; Kiersch, 1962; Spiegel
and Cardena, 1991; Draijer and Langeland, 1999; Xiao et al., 2006;
Jones et al., 2007; Seligman and Kirmayer, 2008). As Goldsmith
et al. (2009) remarked, Pliny the Elder (23–79 A.D.) already had
talked about “fright” as being one of the causes of partial or total
memory “loss.”
In line with these views, Markowitsch developed a model of
functional amnesia that postulates that the memory impairment
in the episodic-autobiographical domain in functional retrograde
amnesia preponderantly reflects a stress hormone mediated mem-
ory blockade, underpinned by right hemispheric synchronization
abnormalities during retrieval attempts between the frontal lobe
system – important for autonoetic consciousness, search initiation
and monitoring, and the temporo-amygdalar system – impor-
tant for emotional processing (Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2007,
2009). This memory impairment is opined to be triggered by
adverse life conditions, usually of a recurrent nature and with onset
in childhood or early adulthood; it is modulated by several fac-
tors, such as genes, personality characteristics, early parent-child
attachment style, medical and psychiatric comorbidities, familial,
ecological, and socio-cultural environment and epigenetic factors.
Although some authors pointed to a direct relationship between
the severity of exposure to trauma and incidence of dissocia-
tive amnesia (see the review of Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008),
Markowitsch and co-workers described several patients who devel-
oped functional or dissociative amnesia after a seemingly objective
minor stressor (Markowitsch, 2003; Fujiwara et al., 2008). This
stressor was either psychological or physical (such as mild trau-
matic brain injury or mild physical injury) or a combination of
the two. In most of these patients, a careful anamnesis revealed a
history of recurrent stressful experiences with onset in early life,
suggesting a mechanism of kindling sensitization or an incubation
effect. In a substantial number of cases, functional amnesia co-
occurred with a background of immigration and was attributed to
a high allostatic load in this population. “‘Allostatic load’ refers to
the price body pays for being forced to adapt to adverse psychoso-
cial or physical situations, and it represents either the presence
of too much stress or the inefficient operation of the stress hor-
mone system” (McEwen, 2000, pp. 110–111). Psychological stress
is however not considered to be sufficient for the development of
functional amnesic condition. This was already implied by Janet,
who reportedly suggested that the impact of trauma on a particu-
lar individual may dependent on a variety of factors (such as the
personality features, prior experiences and the intensity, duration,
and recurrence of the trauma) and might not become obvious
immediately, but after a certain latency period (van der Kolk and
van der Hart, 1989). Along the same line, Markowitsch and his
colleagues have proposed that traumatic experiences interact in a
time sensitive manner with genetic dispositions (with protective or
deleterious effect; Becker-Blease et al., 2004) and other environ-
mental factors (with buffering or exacerbating effects; Staniloiu
et al., 2010b). In order to better causally model the emergence
of functional amnesia or other psychopathological conditions in
migrants, Markowitsch and co-workers supported proposals for a
broadening of the conceptual understanding of the environment
to encompass elements of the perinatal environment, personal life
style habits and family, socio-cultural, and ecological environment
(Hinton et al., 2008; Charney, 2012).
Changes in environment (especially these occurring in early
life) were hypothesized to lead to genomic adaptations with con-
sequences for stress hormonal response pattern, brain synaptic
plasticity, and processing of incoming information (Markowitsch,
2003; cf. also Fries et al., 2005; McGowan et al., 2009). Several
key brain structures for autobiographical memory and emotional
processing have been identified as being sensitive to the conse-
quences of exposure to stressful experiences (such as amygdala
and hippocampal formation, prefrontal cortex, and specific white
matter tracts). The effects of stress on the above mentioned brain
structures depend on their vulnerability, the magnitude of the neu-
rotoxic (glucocorticoid) cascade, and the stage of development or
declining of the respective structures (Lupien et al., 2009). This
may partly explain why the same type of traumatic experiences
results in different brain morphological or functional changes and
a multifarious, Iliad-like psychopathology (Briquet, 1859/1999; de
Kloet and Rinne, 2007).
The hypothesis that increased glucocorticoid levels play a sig-
nificant role in the mnestic blockade has received empirical sup-
port from several studies (for a review, see de Kloet and Rinne,
2007). The right hemispheric synchronization abnormality dur-
ing retrieval attempts in functional or dissociative amnesia was
suggested by a number of functional neuroimaging studies. In
a study in which glucose-PET data obtained at rest from 14
patients with dissociative amnesia and severe retrograde episodic-
autobiographical memory impairments were analyzed, it was
found that the right temporo-frontal region was hypometabolic
in a significant number of patients, with a significant reduction
in the right inferolateral prefrontal cortex (Brand et al., 2009). A
reinforcement of these results came in the same year from the work
of Tramoni et al. (2009), who in a patient with functional amne-
sia performed magnetization transfer ratio measurement and MR
spectroscopic imaging and found evidence of significant meta-
bolic and subtle structural changes within the white matter of the
right prefrontal region.
The psychological stress model: stress and
episodic-autobiographical memory consolidating defect
As mentioned above cases of functional anterograde amnesia
in the absence of retrograde episodic-autobiographical memory
impairments have rarely been reported (Staniloiu et al., 2010a).
As a consequence, neuroimaging data on these cases are sparse
and inconclusive (Smith et al., 2010). We have encountered sev-
eral cases of functional anterograde amnesia (Markowitsch et al.,
1999; Staniloiu et al., 2010a). We conjecture that a stress hormone
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mediated consolidating deficit may partly account for the observed
memory impairments. The stressful experience may lead to a con-
solidating defect by directly impacting on the function or structure
of brain regions involved in the consolidation of memory and/or
by afflicting the wake-sleep cycle (Peigneux et al., 2010; Lynn et al.,
2012).
The executive deficit model in functional amnesia
Kopelman (2000) proposed a different model for the psychogenic
retrograde amnesia that is however not mutually exclusive with
the one advanced by Markowitsch. Kopelman posited that the
inability to retrieve personal events in psychogenic amnesia results
from an increase in the activity of inhibitory regions of the pre-
frontal cortex coupled with a subsequent decrease in the activity
of the hippocampus, similar to the one that occurs in moti-
vated forgetting. In line with Kopelman’s suggestions, Fujiwara
and Markowitsch (2003) argued that the executive control – or
supervisory attentional system – is engaged in holding unwanted
or stressful memories out of self-awareness or autonoetic con-
sciousness. This may result in an overload of the executive system
and may reduce frontal capacities necessary for successful retrieval
of other non-traumatic or non-stressful personal memories in
psychogenic amnesia. In agreement with this model are findings
suggesting that executive functions may co-vary with successful
retrieval of autobiographical memory (Brand et al., 2009). In the
study of Brand et al. (2009), executive dysfunctions were found
in four patients. These patients showed more pronounced retro-
grade memory impairments than those with normal performance
on executive function tests. It is worthwhile mentioning that both
Kopelman’s emphasis on executive functions and Fujiwara and
Markowitsch’s elaboration of the supervisory attentional system
may have been anticipated by Janet (1907). Janet alluded to prob-
lems with executive functions in hysteria. Furthermore, he linked
memory problems in psychogenic amnesia to attentional deficits.
He wrote: “In fact, this incapacity of attention brings with it, as a
consequence, the absence of memory” (p. 314).
Motivated forgetting
The possibility of the existence of an overlap in functional amnesia
between “true” amnesia and simulation has been acknowledged
since long (Lennox, 1943; Barbarotto et al., 1996; Jenkins et al.,
2009). In a subset of patients with functional amnesia there may
be an initial preponderance of conscious feigning or exaggeration
of symptoms coupled with conscious mechanisms that draw on
motivated forgetting or cognitive avoidance (Anderson and Green,
2001; Ortega et al., 2012). With repetition and passage of time, the
conscious use of these mechanisms may “fade” into unconscious
or semiconscious behaviors (Carter, 1853; Erdelyi, 2006) which
act in the favor of preserving self-deception (Smith et al., 2010).
This shift may get translated at the brain level in alterations of
functions and/or structures (Ganis et al., 2003; Reinhold et al.,
2006). For example, a study that investigated the neural correlates
of deception showed right prefrontal activation associated with
rehearsed lies that were part of a coherent story (Ganis et al., 2003).
Although the latter results could be interpreted in various ways,
one hypothesis is that through rehearsal, initiated by motivated
agendas, self-related deceptive material may become familiar to
our “narrative” self to the point that the deceptive material is not
only part of a story we tell others, but also part of a story we tell to
ourselves and we may live by Markowitsch and Staniloiu (2011a).
New research data show that mechanisms that capitalize on mem-
ory suppression become more difficult with age (Anderson et al.,
2011). This may partly explain why most cases of functional amne-
sia are diagnosed in the young age (Coons and Milstein, 1992;
Reinhold and Markowitsch, 2007; Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008).
Incidentally, negative correlations were found between age and
dissociation scale scores (Putnam, 1997).
The impairment in emotional colorization and first person
autonoetic connection
Markowitsch and co-workers (Markowitsch, 1995a,b, 1996;
Markowitsch et al., 1997; Welzer and Markowitsch, 2005) as well
as other researchers (Levine et al., 2009) observed that although
a substantial number of patients with severe retrograde amnesic
conditions might still be able to acquire new memories for
long-term storage, these anterograde memories might lack the
accompanying first person autonoetic emotional engagement and
connection (Fujiwara and Markowitsch, 2006; Eich et al., 2009;
Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2011a). The above changes in antero-
grade conscious mnemonic processing could however escape cap-
turing by standard anterograde memory tests and might subse-
quently require more sophisticated and refined neuropsycholog-
ical testing coupled with functional neuroimaging investigations
(Levine et al., 1998, 2009).
The binding deficiency model
Deficits in binding and reassembling details of the personal
past events may partly account for retrograde
episodic-autobiographical memory impairments
(Fujiwara and Markowitsch, 2006; Rosenbaum et al., 2009), such as
in cases of functional amnesia with malfunction of hippocampal
formation (Markowitsch et al., 1998, 2000a).
The fantasy proneness model or the cognitive failures model (errors
by commission)
The debate surrounding fantasy versus false memory versus true
memory of trauma has persisted since the Freud’s time (for a
review, see Mitchell and Black, 1995) and has occasionally been
marked by incisive and unilateral positions, leading to break ups
between various schools of thought (for a review, see Mitchell and
Black, 1995). Adherents to the fantasy model have argued that the
reports of traumatic memories in dissociative disorders are largely
errors of commission, due to fantasy proneness, suggestibility, or
cognitive failures (e.g., executive dysfunctions; Dalenberg et al.,
2012). Some authors described a heightened risk of false memories
(including confabulations) in patients predisposed to dissociation
(Lynn et al., 2012). A systematic and rigorous evaluation of the sus-
ceptibility for false memory syndrome (confabulations, intrusions,
false memory recognition) in patients with functional or dissocia-
tive amnesia however is missing (Fujiwara, 2004; Kritchevsky et al.,
2004; Borsutzky et al., 2008, 2010; Dalenberg et al., 2012).
Hypnotizability traits have been postulated to be associated
with a higher tendency for developing dissociative symptoms
(Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008), though studies investigating the
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relationship between trait hypnotizability and risk for developing
various dissociative (conversion) disorders yielded mixed results
(Bell et al., 2011). Albeit hypnosis may facilitate access to dissoci-
ated memories in certain psychogenic amnesic conditions, there
is some evidence suggesting a higher likeliness of confident errors
accompanying hypnosis recall (Maldonado and Spiegel, 2008).
In a recent review of fantasy proneness model, Dalenberg et al.
(2012, p. 1) concluded that“dissociation remains related to trauma
when fantasy proneness is controlled.” The authors furthermore
stated that they “find little support that dissociation–trauma rela-
tionship is due to fantasy proneness or confabulated memories of
trauma” (p. 1).
The loss of information model
Both normal (Spiegel et al., 2011) and pathological forgetting (in
the sense of loss of information; Huppert and Piercy, 1979) may
occur in patients with functional amnesia. In patients with func-
tional retrograde amnesia, who recover most of the conscious
memories of the personal past, but continue to experience dif-
ficulties with recovering information from the period just prior
to the traumatic incident, loss of information may be a possi-
ble explanation. This loss of information (Ribot, 1882) could be
attributed to the fact that those particular memories were not fully
“organized” (Burnham, 1903; Markowitsch, 1992) or consolidated
(Haist et al., 2001) at the time of the incident. Loss of informa-
tion may also occur in patients with functional amnesia, who
suffer global intellectual deterioration over time (Markowitsch,
1992; Ladowsky-Brooks and Fischer, 2003). Porter and Landfield
(1998) underlined the connection between the stress-related cog-
nitive decline, the potential contribution of glucocorticoids to
accelerated aging, the fronto-temporal dysfunction, and the later
development of dementia. Since then a number of studies pointed
to the relationship between psychological stress and dementia (e.g.,
Yaffe et al., 2010). There are however no systematic studies looking
at the relationship between functional amnesia and dementia.
Socio-cognitive models of functional amnesia
The episodic-autographical memory is a superior neurocognitive
ability, which is likely affected by genes, environment – includ-
ing the socio-cultural milieu – and their interplay (Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012a). Social learning and expectancies, interac-
tion with third parties (therapist cueing, health insurance poli-
cies), media influences, culturally molded sensation schemas, and
explanatory models of illness may shape, perpetuate, or magnify
the symptomatology in functional amnesia (Hinton et al., 2008).
Linden et al. (2012),analyzing the manifestations of trauma during
World War I, tried to raise the awareness that psychological mani-
festations of trauma may change their nature over time. “Clinical
phenomenology is likely to have been a product of the type of
trauma, the medical models available at the time and other cul-
tural factors, but their exact interplay is still a matter for research”
(p. 262).
In cases of functional amnesia occurring after a mild trau-
matic brain injury, the so coined diagnosis threat itself may influ-
ence neuropsychological test performance and symptom report-
ing. The terminology “diagnosis threat” derives from the concept
of stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson, 1995), when a group
member shows dismal performance on a task opined to be difficult
for the group (Ozen and Fernandes, 2011).
DIFFERENTIAL DIAGNOSIS OF FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA
Functional amnesia has to be differentiated from amnesic dis-
orders preponderantly etiologically linked to a general medical
condition, amnesic disorders for substances, or gene-memory
impairments accompanying various psychiatric conditions (for a
review, see Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). Furthermore true
amnesia has to be distinguished from feigned amnesia, which is
not always an easy task. As Spiegel et al. (2011, p. 835) recently
emphasized“in cases where the DA (dissociative amnesia) involves
distress over current life conflicts or indiscretions, there may
be a mixture of dissociative and factitious/malingered elements,
making for a difficult differential diagnosis.”
CASE REPORT – THE SEARCH FOR MODELING “FORGETTING” IN
FUNCTIONAL AMNESIA AND ITS DISCONTENTS
“Many patients and their symptoms radiate away from the pro-
totype,” but that does not mean that they are not true functional
amnesic cases, “anymore than the oddities of an ostrich make it
any the less a bird.” (Hacking, 1995, p. 32)
Mrs. X is a 47-year-old right-handed married woman, who shortly
after turning age 36 years incurred a mild traumatic brain injury
due to a car accident. Since the accident, Mrs. X has developed
numerous somatic and psychological symptoms that have resulted
in significant global functional impairment and inability to work.
Incidentally, the accident incurred by Mrs. X occurred approx-
imately a year after Mrs. X’s husband was diagnosed with an
illness that interfered with his own working ability. At the time
of Mrs. X’s referral for the present neuropsychological assessment
(that took place 11 and 12 years after her accident), Mrs. X had
provisional diagnoses of postconcussive syndrome or commotion
cerebri and was receiving treatment with anti-migraine medica-
tion (non-steroidal anti-inflammatories) and ergotherapy. For the
purpose of the assessment, a clinical interview was conducted with
Mrs. X, her husband and the aid of a mother tongue (Hispanic lan-
guage) interpreter. Copies of medical records, which Mrs. X made
available to the present investigators, were also reviewed. Informed
written consent was obtained for the participation in the study and
publication of the report. The study adhered to the declaration of
Helsinki.
A consistent accident history was provided by the patient’s
husband and copies of reports from various health profession-
als involved in her care or assessment. Mrs. X was a pedestrian at
the time of the accident. While she was lawfully crossing the street
along the pedestrian line, she was hit by a car that was reportedly
driving at low speed. The accident was witnessed by Mrs. X’s sons,
who were accompanying her.
After the accident Mrs. X was immediately taken to the emer-
gency room of a neighboring hospital, where she spent 3 days as an
inpatient. In the hospital she was noted to be lightly dazed and she
scored 14 on the Glasgow Coma Scale. She reportedly presented
with both anterograde and retrograde amnesia for the events from
the time period surrounding the accident. The pupils were sym-
metrically isochoric and normally reactive to light. There were no
signs of focal neurological abnormalities. On physical exam, Mrs.
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X was noted to have a right frontal superficial laceration with the
longest diameter of 3 cm and a swollen and painful left hand. A
low grade fracture of the left scaphoid was diagnosed and Mrs. X
received a left forearm volar splint, which she apparently wore for
3 months. Given the observed persistence (but no further deteri-
oration) of the slight obnubilation a head computer tomography
(CT) was performed. The head CT was negative for signs of skull
fracture, intracerebral bleeding, or other pathological changes. The
lacerated wound was treated locally. The patient was discharged
home after 3 days, with a diagnosis of cerebral commotion and left
scaphoid fracture.
There was no formal medical documentation of loss of con-
sciousness at the time of the accident. The patient however
reported later that she was told by the family members that she had
lost consciousness at the time of the accident. The husband stated
that he went to see Mrs. X in the hospital immediately after her
admission, but she did not remark his presence in the first 24 h.
Initially, she reportedly appeared unable to say anything. Later she
asked him who he was. The husband also reported that several
hours later, Mrs. X could only say her date of birth, but seemed
unable to give any information about her children or family and
she did not seem to know how she had gotten in the hospital. Over
the month following the accident, Mrs. X’s clinical picture pro-
nouncedly and gradually worsened and has pretty much remained
so since then. She presented with difficulties focusing attention and
concentrating, progressive memory impairments of both retro-
grade and anterograde nature, word finding difficulties, markedly
decreased ability to communicate in the second (Roman) lan-
guage (Calabrese et al.,2001),difficulties with calculations,massive
psycho-motor retardation, apathy, and significant impairment of
functioning. She reportedly showed growing difficulties with inde-
pendently managing the household chores, which she had done
before, with the consequence that they had to either be undertaken
by her husband or performed by her under his close supervi-
sion. She herself complained of forgetfulness first approximately
3 weeks after the accident, though her insight into the extent of her
memory difficulties seemed to be only partial. In addition, she did
not seem to exhibit a high degree of concern about her neurocog-
nitive difficulties. During assessments with various examiners or
treating health professionals, she usually volunteered very little
information spontaneously. Her complaints mainly consisted of
somatic symptoms such as headaches, preponderantly located on
the right side, neck pain, dizziness (when taking the stairs down
or changing position from squatting to standing), left shoulder
pain, double vision, fatigue, sensitivity to noise, and disturbed
sleep. According to the husband, shortly after the accident Mrs. X
experienced middle insomnia and easy startle responses to traffic
noises, but no nightmares. Most recently, she showed increased
need for sleep, although she described her sleep as being non-
refreshing. She reported difficulties with remembering what tasks
she was supposed to do in the house, stating that she would forget
them after a few minutes. She complained of discomfort with being
alone in her house and also expressed no desire to leave the house
alone. When questioned about particular fears, she denied. How-
ever,her husband reported that Mrs. X would often seem distressed
when crossing the street and would subsequently cling to him. Mrs.
X’s husband portrayed Mrs. X as having been an energetic, daring
woman prior to her accident. He described a marked change in her
personality and behavior after the accident and perceived her as
being apathetic and disinterested in most things she used to enjoy
before. He remarked that Mrs. X still derived pleasure from being
with him and their two sons. In addition he noted that she seemed
to enjoy spending time and playing with small children (offspring
of relatives or acquaintances). He stated that Mrs. X appeared
to have difficulties with correctly appreciating distances between
objects as well as judging the feelings of others. According to the
husband, during a trip back to her hometown, Mrs. X had marked
difficulties recognizing her relatives and showed signs of distress.
Mrs. X’s eating preferences appeared to have changed since the
accident and she reported an increased consumption of sweets.
In terms of medical and laboratory work up, a repeated neu-
rological exam of Mrs. X performed 1 year after the accident was
significant for anosmia (bilaterally), decreased ability of standing
on the left leg and a tendency to deviate on the right side during
the Unterberger test.
An MRI of her brain performed 2.5 years after the accident was
described as unremarkable; a regular EEG undertaken 1.5 years
after accident showed rapid alpha-rhythm with increased beta-
activity. There was no evidence of seizure discharges. The EEG
was formally read as yielding no pathological findings.
With respect to treatments, ergotherapy treatment was partly
helpful with respect to fine finger movement and coordination.
According to Mrs. X and her husband, Mrs. X had no history of
alcohol or illicit substance use and no psychiatric or medical ill-
ness prior to the car accident (information that was consistent with
previous documentation on file). The family history revealed that
both of her sons developed difficulties with depressed mood after
the onset of Mrs. X’s difficulties with memory and other cognitive
functions.
The developmental history revealed that Mrs. X was born and
raised in a small town in a family with five children. According to
information obtained from the husband, Mrs. X was apparently
the product of a normal pregnancy and delivery and achieved nor-
mal developmental milestones. Her childhood was uneventful. She
completed 8 years of schooling.
Mrs. X came to a central European country at age 29, where she
obtained a legal working permit. In this country, she successfully
worked on a part time basis as a cleaner until her accident, with-
out any conflict or significant absence. At the time of the present
neuropsychological assessment, Mrs. X was deemed unable to
work and she was receiving disability benefits. Mrs. X denied any
history of developmental abuse, assault, torture, or political per-
secution. She also denied any marital conflict and reported a good
relationship with her husband and children.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT
The following tests were administered (or attempted to be
administered):
Tests for the estimation of intelligence and overall cognitive status
Abbreviated Wechsler Adult Intelligence Test-Revised (Block test
and Picture Completion test; Dahl, 1972); DemTect (Calabrese
and Kessler, 2000).
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Tests for the evaluation of attention, concentration, and processing
speed Trail Making Test A and B (TMT-A+TMT-B; Lezak, 1995);
Attention Index of the German version of the Wechsler Memory
Scale-R (WMS-R; Härting et al., 2000). Short-term memory and
working memory (WMS-R; digit span and block span forward
and backward).
Tests for the evaluation of constructional functions [Copy adminis-
tration of the Rey–Osterrieth Figure Test (Osterrieth,1944; Lezak,
1995)].
Tests fort the evaluation of the verbal and non-verbal explicit
anterograde long-term memory Wechsler Memory Scale-R; Rey–
Osterrieth Figure; Copy trial followed by delayed recall after
30 min (Lezak, 1995).
Tests for the evaluation of explicit retrograde memory Semantic
knowledge (Schmidtke and Vollmer-Schmolck, 1999); Bielefeld
Autobiographical Memory Interview BAGI; Fast et al., 2012.
Test for evaluation of prospective memory Recalling to perform
an intended future action, in particular to ask at the ending of
the testing for a personal object that the examiner had borrowed
from the patient and hid it in the examining room, in response to
a pre-specified time-based cue, namely the ending of the testing.
Tests for the assessment of executive functions, including prob-
lem solving, cognitive flexibility Trail Making Test-B (Lezak,
1995); Tower of Hanoi (Lezak, 1995).
Tests of verbal fluency Controlled Oral Word Association Test
[COW]; Supermarket task (word production); Boston-Naming
Test (Lezak, 1995).
Tests for evaluation of malingering tendencies Test of Memory
Malingering (TOMM; Tombaugh, 1996; Teichner and Wagner,
2004); Rey 15-item-test.
Tests for evaluation of emotional processing Florida Affect Bat-
tery, Subtests 1–3 (Facial Discrimination; Facial Affect Discrim-
ination; Facial Affect Naming; Bowers et al., 1991; Emotional
Pictures Test; von Cramon et al., 1993).
Tests for mood screening Beck Depression Interview (BDI; Beck
et al., 1995).
As the patient was difficult to test, additional information
was obtained in interviews with her. Prior to starting the testing
process, Mrs. X. was asked a series of general interview questions,
to assess for problems with awareness and orientation. She was
unable to correctly identify her age, date of birth, date at the
time of the assessment, location of assessment, or home address.
When queried about her current mood, she described it as “tired.”
Mrs. X’s husband confirmed her current limitations in function-
ing and stated that he has had to take over many of the tasks
that she assumed responsibility for previously (e.g., organizing
finances, cooking). She reported that she has neither “wishes” nor
the “desire” for anything, apart from “sleep,” watching soap operas




Mrs. X came to the assessment accompanied by her husband, sat
near him and often tried to turn to him for the right answers or
reassurance during the interview. She looked younger than her
documented age and her behavior appeared to be childish. She
volunteered spontaneously little information about herself. When
queried, she often answered with very short sentences or used
single words or two – word utterances or short telegraphic utter-
ances. At times, instead of giving a verbal answer she just pointed
to an object representing the answer with her index finger. She at
times seemed to play with language, exaggerating the articulation
of the syllables of certain words (such as her given name). When
she spoke with longer sentences, her speech was fluent and there
was no evidence of paraphasias. Although, overall, her compre-
hension of the mother tongue was good, Mrs. X at times turned to
her husband for the explanation of a word. For instance, she had
claimed not to understand the meaning of a name designating a
well-known European country and, similarly to another patient
with functional amnesia described in the literature by De Renzu
et al. (1997), she then seemed puzzled to find out that it was a
country. She had marked difficulties with naming the days of the
week or the months of the year in temporal order and used her
fingers to count them (De Renzu et al., 1997).
When asked about her age, Mrs. X adamantly stated that she
was 35-year-old (misjudging her age by approximately 12 years).
She ignored the statements of her husband, who tried to contra-
dict her. The husband attributed her misjudgment of age to her
fear of becoming old. Mrs. X was not able to provide her date of
birth, however. She did not know the date, day of the week or year.
When asked about the season, she responded “cold” (the inter-
view indeed took place in the winter). She then inquired “Why am
I here?” When asked, how old her children were, she responded
“big,” implying that they were grown up. When asked, whether
the children were still at home, she said “school” – implying that
they still were going to school. She did not know the first names
of her children, but said that the younger one was taller than the
older.
Mrs. X could not explain the discrepancy between her self-
reported age and having grown up children, which was pointed
out to her by her husband. She however did not seem concerned
about this discrepancy and stated that she knew that they were
her children because they call her “mother.” When Mrs. X was
asked about ever feeling like someone who failed, she seemed to
be offended by this question (which was part of the BDI). She
replied that she felt an accomplished woman because she had two
sons and a loving husband. While saying this, she pointed to her
husband with her index finger, smiling childishly.
When asked about her childhood, Mrs. X provided very little
information. She did not know anything about her school time.
She just said that she lived with her mother in a house. When
she was asked whether she had brothers or sisters, she first did
not respond. When the examiner reformulated the question in a
forced choice format asking her if she had one or two siblings, Mrs.
X responded “three.” She stated that one was a brother. For one
sister she gave her first name. (Mrs. X’s husband later stated that
Mrs. X in fact had five siblings).
When asked where she was born, Mrs. X first said “no,” then
she correctly named her country of origin and added that it was
“warmer” there. When she was queried about her activities during
the day, she first did not respond. When she was asked explic-
itly: “What do you do in morning, what during lunch time, what
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in the afternoon?” she said “morning-problem, afternoon-better
after rest.”
When the interviewer inquired whether she watched TV, Mrs.
X responded: “nice soap operas.” When she was queried about
her ability to recall the content of the watched soap operas, she
responded she would know the persons: “names no; good person,
bad person, yes.”Her husband confirmed that Mrs. X indeed spent
time watching TV on a daily basis, except for Sundays. He added
that initially after the accident Mrs. X had marked difficulties with
distinguishing the TV reality from the true outer world reality.
She also had complained initially of difficulties with following a
movie.
Sometimes Mrs. X would reportedly go for shopping in a small
store, but she avoided bigger stores, for reasons she was not able
to verbalize. She would leave the house infrequently and when she
did so she was most of the time accompanied by her husband. She
reportedly had re-learned how to use the washing machine, but
would not do the laundry.
During the initial interview and the ensuing testing, Mrs. X
often played with her fingers and covered both hands with the
sleeves of her jacket. She at times shook her leg and exhibited
grimacing movements of her lips. She denied feeling anxious,
however. She frequently complained of feeling tired, rubbed her
eyes with her hands, and yawned. On a couple of occasions,
she asked if the testing was over so she could go home and
sleep.
All the testing instructions were given to her in the mother
tongue, though it is unclear if Mrs. X always fully comprehended
them. Mrs. X tried to give an answer for each test item, but her
level of engagement and effort was inconsistent. When she had to
attend to tasks involving potentially gratifying stimuli, her level of
engagement and alertness seemed to increase, however.
Overall, observations of Mr. X’s approach to tasks suggested
that she might not have put forth a concerted and consistent effort.
This may be congruent with her exceptionally poor performance
on nearly all tasks, including measures of memory malingering.
Consequently, some test results might not be a valid indicator
of her cognitive abilities. However, a qualitative account of her
responses and behavior during the testing process is described
below.
INTELLIGENCE AND OVERALL COGNITIVE STATUS
Abbreviated Wechsler intelligence test
From the intelligence test subtests Mrs. X was able to construct
patterns as presented on a model, but needed a long time (140 s
for the simplest patterns of the Block test). In the Picture Compre-
hension subtest she only detected missing parts, after the examiner
had pointed out in what area the missing part was located or
what it might have consisted of. She only pointed with her fin-
ger, but did not name certain missing parts, such as the leg of a
crab.
DemTect
The patient was not able to engage in the first part of the test,
consisting of a word list. Subsequently, no other subtests were
administered.
TESTS FOR THE EVALUATION OF ATTENTION, CONCENTRATION, AND
PROCESSING SPEED
Trail making test A and B
Mrs. X managed to complete the practice samples of the TMT-
A+B. She however completed the testing part of the TMT-A with
significant difficulty, requiring constant correction and redirec-
tion after she had made several errors. She was unsuccessful with
completing the testing part of the TMT-B.
Attention index of the German version of the Wechsler memory
scale-R
The patient did not engage in these tests.
Copy administration of the Rey–Osterrieth figure test
Mrs. X reached 28 points (below the 10th percentile of matched
controls).
TESTS FOR THE EVALUATION OF THE VERBAL AND NON-VERBAL
EXPLICIT ANTEROGRADE LONG-TERMMEMORY
WMS-R (logical memory test)
The patient had significant difficulties with answering questions
pertaining to personal and current information and orientation.
She stated that her age was 35 years (roughly the age when the
accident occurred) instead of 47 years. On Mental Control tests,
she could not say the alphabet; she only said “D,” when the exam-
iner started with “ABC.” Mrs. X only could repeat a few single
digits. Only one of the two stories of the Logical Memory Test was
administered and on this test Mrs. X gained 4 out of 25 points
at immediate recall. After 30 min Mrs. X did not recall anything.
Since Mrs. X’s performance was already deemed severely impaired
on the above conditions, other subtests were not administered.
Rey–Osterrieth figure 30 min recall
Mrs. X performed very poorly (see Table 1).
TESTS FOR THE EVALUATION OF EXPLICIT RETROGRADE MEMORY
Bielefeld autobiographical memory interview
Mrs. X could not provide any memory of a past personal event
that would satisfy criteria for having an episodic-autobiographical
quality (Tulving, 2005).
Semantic general knowledge
Mrs. X had marked difficulties with answering questions concern-
ing famous events, historical names, and geographical names.
TEST FOR EVALUATION OF PROSPECTIVE MEMORY
The examiner requested a personal object (the wedding ring) from
the examinee at the beginning of the testing session. The examinee
was instructed to ask the examiner for the return of her per-
sonal object at a specific point in time in the future. The patient
did not ask for it spontaneously in response to the pre-specified
time-related cue. Only after being given several verbal cues by the
examiner, the examinee recalled that her wedding ring had been
taken by the examiner and consequently asked for it being returned
to her.
TEST FOR EVALUATION OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONS
Trail making test-B
The patient performed very poorly on this task.
Frontiers in Psychology | Cognition November 2012 | Volume 3 | Article 403 | 14
Staniloiu and Markowitsch Psychogenic amnesia
Table 1 | Summary of test results.
Raw score Comment
ATTENION, CONCENTRATION
Trail making test A+B A: 123 s, 1 error; B: not applicable Far below average
INTELLIGENCE
Abbreviated Wechsler intelligence test Only half of the tests solved Far below average
ANTEROGRADE MEMORY PERFORMANCE
Rey–Osterrieth figure, copy 28 Points Below average
Rey–Osterrieth figure, redrawing after 30 min 5 Points Far below average
EMOTIONAL PICTURE RECOGNITION
Recognition of emotional pictures 33 Errors (out of 80 stimuli) Far below average
REMOTE MEMORY PERFORMANCE
Bielefeld autobiographical Memory No answers No evidence for recall of autobiographical
Interview episodes
PROSPECTIVE MEMORY
Remembering of having given an item to the tester Remembrance only after several
reminders and hints
Below average
PROBLEM SOLVING ABILITY, COGNITIVE FLEXIBILITY
Tower of Hanoi (three-disk-version) Only after the third demonstration she
succeeded in solving it
Far below average
Controlled oral word test No adequate response Far below average
Supermarket task 4 Responses Far below average
Boston-test, naming 5 out of 60 correct; frequently only
descriptions
Far below average
EMOTIONS, FEELINGS,THEORY OF MIND-ABILITIES
Florida affect battery
Facial discrimination (subtest 1) 75% Correct Far below average
Facial affect discrimination (subtest 2) 75% Correct Far below average
Facial affect naming (subtest 3) 55% Correct Far below average
Emotional picture recognition 33 Errors (out of 80 stimuli) Far below average
TENDENCIES FOR MALINGERING
15-Item-test Nothing correctly reproduced Malingering
Questionable
TOMM, first trial 26/50 Malingering
Questionable
TOMM, second trial 15/50 Malingering
Questionable
TOMM, recognition 23/50 Malingering
Questionable
Beck depression inventory Answers to only part of the questions No tendency for depression
Tower of Hanoi
The patient was unable to successfully complete the task. The
patient was unable to follow the instructions. Only after the
examiner demonstrated (simplest) three-disk-version task twice,
Mrs. X was able to perform it as well, but she still needed
redirection and correction in order to prevent her from engag-
ing in unacceptable movements. She therefore appeared to be
unable to keep track of instructions even in simple, play-like
situations.
TESTS OF VERBAL FLUENCY
Controlled oral word association test
She did not produce any word in response to a given phonemic
cue (letter).
Supermarket task (semantic cue verbal fluency task)
Mrs. X just named “bread, fruits, juice, chocolate” (items that she
in fact reportedly enjoyed eating).
Boston-naming test
She only could name very simple objects. Frequently she either
gave perceptual descriptions or used terms that shared percep-
tual similarities: Instead of “mushroom” she said “lamp,” point-
ing to a table lamp close to her which had a mushroom-like
shape. Instead of “cactus” she said “plant,” instead of “pen-
cil” “something to write,” instead of “comb” “something for the
hair,” instead of “toothbrush” “something for the teeth,” instead
of “rhinoceros” “something like a cow,” instead of “unicorn”
“horse.”
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TESTS FOR EVALUATION OF MALINGERING TENDENCIES
Rey 15-item-test
She was unable to reproduce the 15-items; she just wrote for the
first line (with numbers 1, 2, 3) 1, 3, 5, 4.
Test of memory malingering
Mrs. X was given the TOMM in order to help determine whether
she has bona fide memory impairments. Mrs. X scored extremely
low on both recall and retention trials of this forced choice test. In
the first trial she produced 26 out of 50 items correct, in the sec-
ond, 15 out of 50, and in the recognition trial she answered 23 out
of 50 correctly. This means that she performed in two trials nearly
exactly at chance level and in one even considerably below chance
level (i.e., below the 95% confidence interval for chance perfor-
mance). When a non-demented examinee achieves a score below
18/50 (i.e., the lowest score that one can achieve within the 95%
confidence interval for chance performance), it usually implies
that the person knew some of the pictures were correct but inten-
tionally picked the incorrect picture. In particular, performance on
Trial 2 was traditionally found to be very high for non-malingers
regardless of age. Mrs. X’s score on Trial 2 was lower (or worse)
than her score on Trial 1 and below the chance level.
Test of memory malingering is sensitive to malingering and/or
lack of effort. A low score on the TOMM has traditionally sug-
gested that either the individual’s memory impairment on the test
is false or exaggerated or that the low score is due to lack of effort.
According to newer data, TOMM however appears sensitive to
detect the severe cognitive dysfunction associated with dementia.
Therefore TOMM might not be a useful measure of assessing test
motivation for persons with severe intellectual global deficits, such
as in dementia (Teichner and Wagner, 2004).
While we cannot fully rule out an exaggeration of memory
impairment in the case of Mrs. X, we are of the opinion that her
low performance on TOMM might be better accounted for other
factors, given that her performance on all neuropsychological tasks
was dismal (Kessler et al., 1997; Sollman and Berry, 2011). These
factors consist of a global cognitive deterioration coupled with a
lack of concerted and consistent effort. Mrs. X approached some
of the tasks in a seemingly playful, childish manner and showed
an increased interest and level of attention for potentially positive
reinforcing stimuli, such as particular food items (“ice cream”),
flowers. There is also a suspicion that Mrs. X may have not fully
understood the instructions, in spite of that they were commu-
nicated to her by the interpreter in her mother tongue and that
the examiner periodically queried her about her comprehension
of instructions.
TESTS FOR EVALUATION OF EMOTIONAL PROCESSING
Florida affect battery, subtests 1–3
With scores of twice 75% (Facial Discrimination and Facial
Affect discrimination) and 55% (Facial Affect Naming), Mrs. X
performed far below average.
Emotional pictures test
Also in recognizing previously seen emotional pictures she situ-
ates herself with 33 errors (out of 80 stimuli) even below chance
level. It might be speculated that she just looked for novelty and
had acquired only some familiarity or subconscious knowledge of
the previously perceived stimuli (see Figure 1 and description of
memory systems in Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012a). Novelty is
universally found in mammals and probably vertebrates in general
(Wilson and Rolls, 1990; Tulving et al., 1996).
TESTS FOR PSYCHIATRIC SYMPTOMS SCREENING
Beck depression interview
Mrs. X did not give an answer for all the screening questions. She
reported increased need for sleep, decreased libido, difficulties with
attention and concentration, and fatigue. Based on the psychiatric
interview that was carried out with the patient and the collateral
information obtained from her husband, a full constellation of
symptoms suggestive of a diagnosis of major depressive disorder
could not be elicited. Furthermore, no evidence of symptoms sug-
gestive of a bipolar disorder or psychotic disorder was found. Mrs.
X’s clinical presentation and history also did not satisfy diagnosis
criteria for a post-traumatic stress disorder.
DISCUSSION
Unfortunately, a complete profile of Mrs. X’s cognitive strengths
and weaknesses could not be ascertained. She scored extremely
low on all tests of cognitive functioning, with little discrimina-
tion between tasks. In part she might have not understood all
the instructions. Nevertheless, she did not refuse to perform and
always appeared to try to give some kind of answer (e.g., Boston-
naming test). Her performance was gaged as being below her
premorbid intellectual status as estimated on the basis of the collat-
eral information. Mrs. X’s husband told that prior to the accident
Mrs. X always did the tax bills and other paper work for the family,
and she behaved like a normal wife and mother for husband and
family.
Mrs. X’s performance was dismal regardless of the functional
domain, nature of the stimuli, task difficulty, or response mode.
She performed poorly on tests tapping on attention,concentration,
intelligence, executive functions, verbal fluency, anterograde and
retrograde memory, verbal and non-verbal memory, semantic as
well as episodic-autobiographical memory, prospective memory,
and emotional processing. Also in tests of malingering which were
based on remembering of visual items, she performed extremely
deviant from the norm. Though these scores might be indicative
of deliberate simulation, we opted for several alternative interpre-
tations in Mrs. X’s case, for the following reasons. First, Mrs. X
showed signs of global and severe cognitive impairments. Second,
Mrs. X’s performance suggested that she was not putting forth her
best effort. Thirdly, we could not identify any external incentives
which might account for malingering.
Although Mrs. X’s neuropsychological profile might raise the
suspicion of a deliberate effort to feign cognitive impairment, we
considered a diagnosis of malingering very unlikely (Vrij, 2000;
Boone, 2007). With respect to Factitious Disorder, a key dif-
ference between the later and the malingering is considered to
be the nature of motivation (Mayou et al., 2005). According to
the diagnostic criteria for Factitious Disorder, the individual is
motivated to assume the role of a sick person. We did not find
sufficient evidence to suggest that Mrs. X was deliberately trying
to assume the sick role; however, this possibility cannot be fully
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ruled out. As several authors have already underlined, it is often
difficult to accurately assess “the motivating goals that accom-
pany reports of illness” (Bass and Halligan, 2007). Furthermore,
“deception” is not unique to Factitious Disorder; instead, “symp-
tom exaggeration” has been reported in several conditions, such as
mild head injury, depressive disorders, and dissociative disorders
(Krahn et al., 2008).
Based on the neuropsychological findings and the collateral
information, we opined that Mrs. X’s clinical presentation could
be viewed as the result of the complex interplay between psycho-
logical and biological factors and would be best captured by the
construct of functional amnesia. Several authors remarked that a
mixture in variable proportions of psychological and physical fac-
tors contribute to the emergence of functional disorders (Sollier,
1892; Kopelman, 2000).
Mrs. X’s symptoms had their onset after a traumatic brain
injury with right localization (Schore, 2002; Markowitsch and
Staniloiu, 2011a). This finding is congruent with other reports
of functional amnesia occurring after a mild traumatic brain
injury (Kopelman, 2000; Fujiwara, 2004; Serra et al., 2007; Mal-
donado and Spiegel, 2008). Although her traumatic brain injury
was labeled as being mild based on the findings from Glasgow
Coma Scale scores, neurological exam, and conventional structural
imaging, a biological contribution of the traumatic brain injury to
the emergence of her cognitive and affective symptoms cannot be
ruled out. Multifocal diffuse axonal damage can result from mild
traumatic brain injuries and escape capturing by conventional
structural methods (Lipton et al., 2008, 2009). It can lead to exec-
utive dysfunctions as well as impairments of conscious mnemonic
processing (“disconnection syndrome”; Markowitsch,1988,1992).
Although conventional structural neuroimaging techniques typ-
ically do not show any significant structural brain changes in
mild traumatic brain injuries, diffusion tensor imaging studies
have provided evidence of temporally dynamic micro-structural
changes of white matter after mild traumatic brain injury (New-
combe et al., 2012), which correlate with the patients’ performance
on tasks, which tap on a variety of cognitive domains (Lipton et al.,
2008, 2009).
In some cases of mild traumatic brain injury, the use of voxel
based morphometry (Sehm et al., 2011) identified progressive vol-
umetric changes in structures involved in mnemonic processing
(such as the amygdala and hippocampal formation; Venugopal
et al., 2012). Although Mrs. X did not present with gross neurologi-
cal focal signs on physical examination, there were reports of subtle
neurological abnormalities on the left side of the body. Of par-
ticular interest is the documentation of bilateral anosmia, which
may explain Mrs. X’s changes in eating preferences. Anosmia may
also affect the perception of the pheromones with negative con-
sequences for intimate relationships (Reinhold and Markowitsch,
2009). Furthermore an association between changes in olfaction
and memory impairments or alterations of the capacity for empa-
thy has been described in literature (Wilson et al., 2007). Mrs.
X presented with impairments in conscious mnemonic process-
ing, social information processing (judging the feelings of others,
face-emotion judgments) and capacity for intimacy.
As mentioned above, a number of patients with dissociative or
functional amnesia described in the literature had the onset of their
psychiatric symptoms after a traumatic brain injury (Kopelman,
2000; Staniloiu et al., 2010a,b). Similar to Mrs. X, several cases of
the traumatic brain injuries were of mild severity (Miller et al.,
1997) and therefore they were not considered to solely account for
the onset of cognitive difficulties.
From a psychological perspective, the mild traumatic brain
injury could be viewed in Mrs. X’s case both as psychological trau-
matic event and a legitimate escape from a life situation that may
have appeared as inescapable (Kopelman et al., 1994). Although
Mrs. X did not meet criteria for a diagnosis of post-traumatic stress
disorder, she endorsed some symptoms of hyperarousal after the
accident (easy startle to traffic noises, insomnia). The sympto-
matology later shifted to be dominated by hypersomnia, severe
memory impairments, avoidant behavior and various somatic
complaints. Mrs. X’s focus on somatic symptoms coupled with
her scant verbalization of emotions suggest an impairment of
her capacity for emotional processing in face of ongoing stres-
sors. Apart from the traumatic brain injury, Mrs. X seemed to
have encountered other stressful experiences prior to her accident,
such as the one related to the disabling illness of her husband and
the subsequent increase in her parental and care giving demands.
These negative experiences may have been superimposed on a
background of an already increased allostatic load, leading to a
magnification of stress hormonal responses, with lasting conse-
quences for her psychological well-being. As mentioned above,
data from various sources point to an increased allostatic load
in migrants which has been related to pre-migration, migration,
and post-migration experiences (Staniloiu et al., 2010a). An asso-
ciation between alexithymia and dissociative and somatoform
disorders and somatization has been corroborated by several stud-
ies. Connections between traumatic brain injury and alexithymia
have also been reported (Koponen et al., 2005). Although a for-
mal measure of alexithymia was not administered to Mrs. X, both
her clinical presentation and her performance on other tests that
tapped on capacity for emotional processing suggested deficits of
emotional awareness and clarity. We speculate that these deficits
may have pre-dated her mild traumatic brain injury, which in turn
may have exacerbated them.
Apart from retrograde and anterograde amnesia, Mrs. X pre-
sented with symptoms suggestive of the Ganser syndrome (vor-
beireden and nichtwissen; Magnin et al., 2012) as well as a conver-
sion disorder, such as diplopia (Pommerenke et al., 2012). From a
socio-cognitive perspective, we conjecture that social learning and
expectancies may have played a role. As mentioned above, Mrs.
X’s symptoms occurred approximately a year after her husband
was diagnosed with an illness for which he received disability ben-
efits, suggesting a possible unconsciously learned component to
her behavior (Kopelman, 2000).
The onset of Mrs. X’s symptoms was sudden and the symptoms
have persisted for more than 11 years. There are some indications
that over the time her clinical presentation shifted, in the sense
that she showed a lack of concern about her symptoms (difference;
Janet, 1907) and future and signs of regression to pre-operational
ways of thinking. She developed difficulties with judging the feel-
ings of others (egocentrism). She seemed content to live in a noetic
present, which preserved her juvenescence fantasies and perhaps
her fears of death (Suddendorf et al., 2009).
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Although not prototypical,Mrs. X’s case is in our opinion essen-
tial for understanding the functional amnesia. It lends support to
the idea that functional amnesia is a heterogeneous, multifaceted
condition, which extends beyond the episodic-autobiographical
memory impairment (Markowitsch and Staniloiu, 2012b). It sup-
ports the idea that cases of functional amnesia with prominent
anterograde memory impairments may be not as unique or excep-
tionally rare as portrayed in international nosologies (Spiegel et al.,
2011). It provides an example of functional amnesia with a chronic
course (Staniloiu and Markowitsch, 2010a). It links functional
amnesia to an increased allostatic load, which results from both
psychological and physical factors (similarly to transient global
amnesia; Bartsch and Deuschl, 2010). It supports the incubation
model of trauma described by Charcot or Janet (van der Kolk
and van der Hart, 1989; Bogousslavsky, 2011) and the cumula-
tive models of trauma (for a review see Mitchell and Black, 1995).
Furthermore, it raises the awareness about a possibly increased
frequency of dissociative amnesic conditions in migrants (During
et al., 2011).
Additionally, the case points out to a gamut of possibly underly-
ing “forgetting” mechanisms. Its chronic course suggests that loss
of information may be one of these mechanisms, calling for larger
prospective, longitudinal neuropsychological, and neuroimaging
studies that can objectively quantify the changes in conscious
mnemonic processing that may ensue in this condition over time.
CONCLUSION
Sir Lewis (1963, p. 16) remarked the following: “The somatic
pathology of mental disorder is well illuminated in those con-
ditions in which the mental disturbance is invariably associated
with abnormal structural or chemical changes of which it is a
symptom; it is less clear when there are metabolic anomalies or
fluctuations which are unspecific; and it is a very dark chamber,
lit from time to time with tantalizing flashes, in the numerous
‘functional’ disorders.”
Although the strides made in the field of neuroscience have
since then brought some light into the dark chamber of func-
tional disorders, the “riddle” of functional amnesia (Lundholm,
1932) is far from being solved. Despite evidence pointing to
its substantial prevalence, there is a dearth of data about the
evidence-based treatment of functional amnesia (Markowitsch
and Staniloiu, 2012a). This emphasizes the need for larger stud-
ies that should disentangle its neurobiological correlates and
psychosocial underpinnings.
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